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ESSAY
THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF LEGAL
ETHICS: THREE COMMENTS FOR
DAVID LUBAN
William H. Simont
David Luban helped invent the field of legal ethics some years
ago; Legal Ethics and Human Dignity provides an opportunity to assess
how it has developed. By way of both homage and critique, I offer
three comments on central issues that the book raises: the nature of
the moral foundations of lawyers' ethics; the relation of legal and ordinary moral norms in legal ethics decisions; and the relation of ethical
norms and organization.
I associate the issue of moral foundations with the past because
modern academic discussion of legal ethics began with this focus.1
The relationship between law and morals is a more recent focus. 2 I
predict, and hope, that the organizational focus will become dominant in the future. Legal Ethics and Human Dignity reflects this trajectory of preoccupation. The moral foundations discussion briefly
resurfaces in the book in an exhausted state. The book brilliantly advances the discussion of law-and-morals in a way that makes it seem as
if the subject had been brought to a close. The need for an organizational focus is a central implication of some of the most powerful parts
of the book.
I
PAST: Is LAWYERING ABOUT HUMAN DIGNITY?

The master value of Luban's first book, Lawyers and Justice, was
'justice." 3 For unexplained reasons, Legal Ethics and Human Dignity
replacesjustice with "human dignity."'4 Luban notes that invoking digt
1

Arthur Levitt Professor of Law, Columbia University.
See Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM RTs. 1

(1975).
2 See Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral ProfessionalRole: A Defense, A Problem, and
Some Possibilities, 1986 Am.B. FOUND. RES. J. 613 (1986); David Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative: A Response to Stephen Pepper, 1986 Am. B. FOUND. RES. J. 637 (1986).
3 See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY XVii--XXVi (1988).
4
See DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 1-15 (2007) [hereinafter LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY].
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nity has the rhetorical advantage of suggesting an affinity between legal ethics and the increasingly prominent field of international
human rights. 5 I wonder if part of the appeal of the change in terms
is that moving away from 'justice" distances the field from the decreasingly popular idea of social democracy.
The dignity idea does little work in most of the chapters, but it
generates confusion wherever it surfaces. A central problem is that
the idea, as Luban elaborates it, is in deep tension with Luban's attachment to Warren Court criminal defense norms. Luban's effort to
reconcile ideal and practice pushes him to desperate contortions.
Luban defines dignity as the opportunity of individuals "to tell
their stories" when confronting or invoking state power. 6 Telling
one's story means asserting oneself authentically. This is a plausible
interpretation of dignity, but it is difficult to think of an important
value less consistent with the established institutions and practices of
American law. As Luban attempts to grapple with this problem, the
concept is re-shaped to the point where it becomes unrecognizable.
The story a lawyer tells about her client is very often not the client's story in the sense that Luban's dignity idea connotes. This divergence is not due simply to the fact that the lawyer edits the story to
emphasize the facts that the law makes relevant; it is also a consequence of the incentives the legal process creates to reshape the client's own understanding into one that is more likely to invoke the
sympathy of people with power over the client. Criminal defense lawyers often tell their clients how to dress, groom themselves, and talk.
For the client to tell his story is often exactly what lawyers try to avoid.
Thus, in several classic novels-for example, The Red and the Black,
The Brothers Karamazov, and The Stranger-lawyers appear as agents of
the subversion of dignity in Luban's sense of the word. Each of these
books culminates in a trial scene in which the protagonist is forced to
endure the double indignity of having to remain passive while his
agent constructs an image of himself that he cannot recognize. These
novels focus on the distance between the protagonist's sense of self
and the image other people have of him. The trial is portrayed as the
most intense form of this alienation.
This reality might have led Luban to condemn conventional lawyering as inconsistent with his animating ideal. Yet, he does not do so.
For Luban, the law vindicates dignity by creating a right for the individual to tell her story, but it imposes no duty to do so. 7 In the civil
5 See DAVID LUBAN, Lawyers as Upholders of Human Dignity (When They Aren't Busy Assaulting It), in LEGAL ETHICS AND HuMAN DIGNITY, supra note 4, at 65, 67-68 [hereinafter
LuBAN, Upholders of Human Dignity].
6 See id. at 68-69.
7 See LUBAN, Upholders of Human Dignity, supra note 5, at 73.
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sphere, the client has a duty to tell some story, but short of outright
deception, the story does not have to be the client's own. Luban
seems to accept that dramatic re-creation is part of the routine practice of advocacy. 8 However, if dignity is really the core of legal ethics,
it is hard to see how he can be so complacent about the self-fictionalizing pressures of the system. As an illustration of the authentic selfassertion that lies at the heart of his conception of dignity, Luban tells
an anecdote of a Bartleby-like litigant who responds to oppressive

cross-examination by shouting a defiant obscenity.9 But lawyers invariably discourage such gestures, and clients who are inclined to use
them usually prefer to trade away such moments of authenticity for
the increased likelihood of a favorable outcome.
Luban shrinks away from the radical romantic implications of his
view of dignity-as-self-description most clearly when it comes to the
criminal defense norms that he has long defended.10 The privilege
against self-incrimination is a right not to tell your story, and the prosecutor's high burden of proof, as Luban and most defense lawyers interpret it, implies a right of the defendant to tell a false story (either
simply by pleading not guilty when the true story involves guilt or,
more aggressively, by impeaching truthful witnesses and arguing false
inferences)." Luban could have retreated here by suggesting that the
best rationales for these practices are instrumental-for example, as
restraints on abusive official conduct-and conceded that they are exceptions to the dignity interpretation. But apparently, libertarian
criminal defense practices are too important to Luban to remit them
to justifications outside the core of his theory. So, he is pushed to
argue that human dignity requires, in the criminal context, that a defendant be afforded the opportunity not to assert himself or to assert
himself falsely.
Luban argues that the criminal sphere is different because prosecution involves state officers in telling a story about the defendant,
and the prosecutor's story implies collective moral condemnation of
the defendant.1 2 The prosecutor's story portrays the defendant in
shameful terms. Because shaming is a threat to the defendant's dignity, it must be subjected to the most exacting standards, and allowing

8
9

See id. at 73.

Id. at 84.
Sentimentality toward libertarian criminal defense practices is Luban's greatest
weakness. See David Luban, Are CriminalDefenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1729 (1993).
Mine is contentiousness. See William H. Simon, The Ethics of CriminalDefense, 91 MICH. L.
REv. 1703, 1707-13 (1993).
I
See LUBAN, Upholders of Human Dignity, supra note 5, at 72-73.
12 Id. at 73.
10
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the defendant to tell a false story may be the best way to test the solid13
ity of the prosecution's story.
Note that this argument seems to turn instrumental at the end.
The false story (surely a compromise of dignity) is accepted only to
insure the accuracy of the prosecution's potentially true counter-story.
The only work dignity does is give special weight to the concern about
the danger of a false conviction. However, we don't really need dignity to explain why false convictions are bad. Moreover, Luban's idea
of dignity seems to be equally threatened by rightful as by wrongful
convictions. Both rightful and wrongful convictions restrict the defendant's capacity for self-description, and both tell a shameful counterstory about the defendant. The moral reasons for distinguishing between the two have much more to do with justice and the control of
state power than with dignity.
Dignity norms do seem to underpin fundamental legal norms
about civility and fair hearing. However, it is not clear that Luban's
notion of telling one's story aptly describes the relevant intuition of
dignity. For example, the key ingredient of due process is the right to
assert one's claims and the reasons for them, but these claims and
reasons do not necessarily involve a story about oneself. In addition,
dignity values only take us a limited distance in explaining the potential good of law and lawyering. The legal system is fundamentally
about conflict and power, and dignity values do not, even in principle,
adequately discipline conflict and power. A good legal system has to
give ultimate priority to the true story, not to whatever story a citizen
wants to tell about herself.
II
PRESENT: THE TENSION BETWEEN LAW AND MORALS

A longstanding dialectic in legal ethics scholarship concerns the
relative primacy of legal norms on the one hand and ordinary moral
norms on the other. Should the limits of the lawyer's duty to the client be defined solely in terms of the law, or does ordinary morality, as
understood by the lawyer, also impose limits?
In the classic exchange between Stephen Pepper and Luban, Pepper argued for an ethic of liberty bounded only by the law, 14 while

Luban defended the claims of ordinary morality as a central component of professional responsibility. 15 In The Practice of Justice, I suggested that the problem with the "dominant view"-the "zealous

advocacy within the bounds of the law" norm exemplified by Pep13
14

15

Id.
See Pepper, supra note 2, at 615-19.
See Luban, supra note 2, at 637-43.
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per-lay less in its exclusion of ordinary morality than in its implausibly narrow and anachronistic conception of law. 16 As I saw it, many of
the paradigmatic ethical scenarios were better seen in terms of competing legal values than in terms of a conflict between law and morality, and their correct resolution (on which Luban and I more often
than not agree) requires not the triumph of morals over law, but the
vindication of more-fundamental over less-fundamental legal values. 17
For example, Pepper and Luban discussed the case of a wealthy
testator who asks a lawyer to draw a will disinheriting his son because
the son opposes American intervention in the Nicaraguan civil war.' 8
If the law permits the lawyer to carry out the testator's request and the
father's use of his wealth to punish his son's political views violates an
ordinary moral norm, than the example is properly seen as a conflict
between law and morals. For me, however, the most intensely debated
issues of professional responsibility were more analogous to the problem of cross-examining the truthful witness. Here the conflict is best
seen as between two legal norms: a procedural rule that authorizes
impeachment and the rule's underlying purpose to promote accurate
fact-finding (which would be frustrated by the invocation of the rule
in this case). The question is which legal value has greater weight
under the circumstances.
To the extent that both Luban's law-versus-morals and my balancing-of-legal-values characterizations were both semantically permissible, I thought mine rhetorically superior because it emphasized the
continuity between the key concerns of legal ethics and the analytical
skills that lawyers consider characteristic of legal work. Luban (and
others) disagreed, suggesting that only a naive conception of law
could accommodate the range of values and resolutions we both associate with professional responsibility.' 9 In the divide between the "legalist" and the "moralist" critics of the dominant view, Luban seemed
to be a fairly consistent moralist.
Luban does not take up the law-versus-morals debate explicitly in
Legal Ethics and Human Dignity, but five essays implicitly bear on it, and
overall they suggest a way of putting the controversy to rest. Two pairs
of essays re-enact the law-versus-morals dialectic, while deepening understanding of the opposed terms. A fifth essay suggests that it is a
mistake to look for a theoretical resolution of the conflict.
16

See WILLIAM H.

SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAwYERs'

ETHICS

26-52 (1998).
17 See id. at 138-69; see also David Luban, Reason and Passion in Legal Ethics, 51 STAN. L.
REv. 873, 885-88 (1999) (critiquing The Practice ofJustice).
18 See Pepper, supra note 2, at 618; Luban, supra note 2, at 643. The example is drawn
from Wasserstrom, supra note 1, at 7-8.
19
See Luban, supra note 17, at 873-76.
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The first pair of essays considers the jurisprudence of H.L.A.
Hart 20 and Lon Fuller. 2 1 Hart argued for a vision of law as, most basically, constituted authority-authority constituted minimally by operating rules of change, application, and recognition. 22 Fuller insisted
that, for authority to be recognized as law, authority needed to be
more elaborately constituted. 23 In addition to Hart's operating rules,
Fuller's legal authority entailed general values like autonomy and specific ones like generality and prospectivity. 24 Luban endorses Fuller's

perspective but extends it to emphasize that the perspective requires
and implies an ethic of lawyering. 25 Hart and (to a slightly lesser extent) Fuller were preoccupied with judges, but lawyers have the
frontline responsibility for the application of law. A legal system could
not operate effectively unless they, as well as judges, took some responsibility for the vindication of (or in Hart's terms, took the "internal point of view" 2 6 toward) its underlying norms.

Luban's elaboration of Fuller and critique of Hart seem like basic
legalist moves that attenuate the law-versus-morals dialectic by insisting that any ethically relevant conception of law must incorporate
some moral values. Thus, even an ethic grounded in purely legal obligation has to respect an important range of moral values. Nevertheless, the move toward legalism is a limited one. For Fuller, the moral
values inherent in legal norms are basically procedural. 2 7 Although
he has a morally thicker notion of authority than Hart, he still identifies law with constituted authority.
The Hart and Fuller essays complement two other essays that emphasize the limitations of ethics preoccupied with authority. These
essays explore the findings of cognitive psychology on moral decisions.28 Especially pertinent is Luban's discussion of the famous Milgram experiments, which explored the willingness of people to
comply with authority norms (the orders of an instructor) where they
conflicted with ordinary morality (required the infliction of unjustifiable pain).29 One could argue about the proper jurisprudential char20

See DAVID LUBAN, A Different Nightmare and a Different Dream, in LEGAL ETHICS AND

HuMAN DIGNITY, supra note 4, at 131, 131-61.
21
See DAVID LUBAN, Natural Law as Professional Ethics: A Reading of Fuller, in LEGAL
ETHICS AND HuMAN DIGNITY, supra note 4, at 99, 99-130 [hereinafter LUBAN, NaturalLaw].
22
See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPr OF LAW 89-96 (1961).
23
See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 133-51 (2d ed. 14th prtg. 1969).
24
See id.
25
See LUBAN, Natural Law, supra note 21, at 99-130.
26
HART, supra note 22, at 112.
27
See FULLER, supra note 23, at 39.
28
See DAVID Luban, The Ethics of Wrongful Obedience, in LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 4, at 237, 237-66 [hereinafter LUBAN, Wrongful Obedience]; DAVID LUBAN,
Integrity: Its Causes and Cures, in LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 4, at 267,

267-97 [hereinafter LUBAN, Integrity].
29 See LUBAN, Wrongful Obedience, supra note 28, at 239-42.
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acterization of the scenario in the Milgram experiments. Perhaps the
instructor's orders were illegal in some sense. But such concerns are
not important to either Milgram or Luban in these essays. For them,
the experiments frame a contest between authority and ordinary morality in circumstances where ordinary morality should be preeminent. Milgram's and Luban's preoccupation is with fortifying
ordinary morality against the oppressive encroachment of authority in
any guise.
While Luban's Hart/Fuller essays and his experimental psychology essays do not speak directly to each other, the final essay in the
book implies an interesting response to the implicit tension between
legally constituted authority and ordinary morality. A Midrash on
Rabbi Shaffer and Rabbi Trollope focuses on Anthony Trollope's novel
Orley Farm.30 It is one of the best essays ever written in legal ethics
(and, I suspect, law and literature).
Coincidentally, the conflict in Orley Farm centers around a scenario that resembles the oppressive testator example discussed in
Luban's exchange with Pepper. 3 1 A rich widower marries a younger
woman late in life and has a child. Acting out of respect for the convention of primogeniture and callous indifference to his wife and
baby, he makes a will leaving virtually all of his property to the grown
son of his first marriage, even though the older son is already rich,
and the will leaves the mother and child destitute. Facing destitution,
the mother forges a codicil ostensibly leaving her child a modest portion of the estate-Orley Farm-on which she and the child have resided. The forgery remains undetected for years. The novel begins
when an envious solicitor discovers evidence of the forgery and induces the cheated older son to initiate proceedings to expose it.
The novel elaborately dramatizes the conflict between legality (associated with constituted authority, property rules, and the rules
against perjury and forgery) and ordinary morality (associated with
distributive fairness, paternal and spousal responsibility, and maternal
love). The conflict plays out in many dimensions, and Trollope assigns lawyers to make the case for both sides.
Luban is especially concerned with the religious dimension of the
novel. He invokes a Jewish point of view to criticize an earlier Christian interpretation by Thomas Shaffer. Convention might lead us to
expect that the Jewish perspective would be associated with legality
and the Christian with maternal love, but the opposite turns out to be
the case. Shaffer views the novel as turning on the mother's personal
30

See DAVID

LUBAN,

A Midrash on Rabbi Shaffer and Rabbi Trollope, in LEGAL

ETHICS AND

HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 4, at 301, 301-31 [hereinafter LuBAN, Shaffer and Trollope].
31
ANTHONY TROLLOPE, ORLEY FARM (David Skilton ed., Oxford World Classics 4th ed.

2000) (1861); see supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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redemption, which Shaffer sees as occurring through the Christian
ministry of a character who convinces the mother to acknowledge her
32
misdeed and restore the property.
Luban's critique starts by pointing to an important subtheme in
Judaism that excuses and even exalts legal transgressions in situations
analogous to the circumstances of the novel, and he finds these
themes playing an explicit role in the novel. 33 Moreover, he argues
34
that they dominate the themes that Shaffer identified as Christian.
Trollope, he points out, suggests in many ways that things might have
been better if the mother had not confessed and restored the
35
property.
While Luban presents his argument as literary criticism, his interpretation makes Orley Farm look like a powerful work ofjurisprudence.
As jurisprudence, the book's central message is that there is a tension
within both legal and lay culture between legal and moral norms and
that neither law nor ordinary morality can plausibly be seen in either
realm as prior to or more fundamental than the other. (It is possible
to read Luban as interpreting Trollope as siding categorically with ordinary morality, but that is not the reading that makes either work as
good as it can be.) Trollope does this by creating characters and situations that induce us to sympathize alternately with one side and then
the other and, ultimately, with both sides simultaneously. As a practical matter, we can only recognize the competing values, balance them
in context, and take the often high risk of making the wrong choice.
Contemplatively, the best we can do is to fully acknowledge the claims
of each value and their conflict with each other. Law tends to judge
categorically, and legal theory sometimes struggles for categorical resolutions, but the predisposition of ambitious fiction is to judge dialectically. Luban's account of Orley Farm makes it hard to resist the
conclusion that the novel is better equipped to explore the conflict.
III
FUTURE: ETHICAL DECISION AND SOCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES

In two essays, Luban confronts a disturbing lesson of experimental psychology: responses to ethical problems are highly correlated
with social circumstances. 36 Given certain types of pressures, a large
fraction of people make what detached observers agree is the ethically
32

THoMAs L.

SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER: LAW FOR THE INNOCENT

51-52 (1983).
33 LUBAN, Shaffer and Trollope, supra note 30, at 317-18.
34
Id. at 319-21.
35 See id. at 311-12.
36 LUBAN, Wrongful Obedience, supra note 28, at 237-66; LUBAN, INTEGRITY, supra note
28, at 267-97.
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wrong decision-they proceed to torture subjects on the command of
an authority figure (the Milgram experiments); to abuse other subjects playing the roles of prisoners remitted to their custody (the Stanford prison experiment); or fail to offer help to apparently desperate
7
people (the Darley-Latan6 experiments),3
The fact that small manipulations in the experimental situations-for example, introducing a role player who refuses to comply
with orders to torture-can produce large favorable changes in behavior 3 8 is only partly comforting. For this qualification reinforces the
central message that situation accounts for a greater influence on behavior than ethical knowledge, judgment, and character. Since
knowledge, judgment, and character are what ethics teachers devote
themselves to producing, this is a dispiriting message.
Luban's discussion of the experimental literature is masterly, and
his insistence that we take serious account of it is overdue. However,
his discussion of the implications of the literature for professional responsibility is not entirely satisfactory. He plausibly recommends
humility and Stoic determination in the face of the bad news.3 9 Beyond this, Luban suggests some psychological pre-commitment tactics-bright-line tripwires or miner's canaries-to condition us to
40
withstand pressures in foreseeably challenging situations.
However, Luban overlooks an implicit critique of legal ethics
pedagogy that is both deeper and more obvious. If in practice judgment is swamped by the pressures of circumstance, perhaps we should
spend less time focusing on judgment and more on circumstance. In
particular, we should be studying and teaching about how practice
can be structured in ways that make for ethically better decisions.
There is another way to put the point. There are at least two
important tacit limitations on the experimental research. First, the
experiments did not involve reflective judgment. All of them tested
responses in which the subjects were discouraged or precluded from
thinking about their decisions. Second, they all involved individual
decisions. The subjects were not obliged or permitted to discuss or
41
explain their ideas with others prior to acting.
Most discussion of ethics-both normative and empirical-takes
this individualist perspective for granted. Ethical decision making is
conflated with individual decision making. The most resonant cul37
See STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW (1974);
Craig Haney et al., InterpersonalDynamics of a Stimulated Prison, 1 INT'L J. CRIMINOLOGY &
PENOLOGY 69 (1973); John M. Darley & Bibb Latan6, Bystander Intervention in Emergencies:
Diffusion of Responsibility, 8J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 377 (1968).
38 See LUBAN, Wrongful Obedience, supra note 32, at 266.
39 LUBAN, Integrity, supra note 28, at 291-94, 296-97.
40 Id. at 291-97.
41 See id.
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tural image of it is the individual courageously standing for justice
against the massed forces of corruption.
Lawyers once practiced alone; they now practice in groups. The
organizational form does not require group decision making, but it
encourages and facilitates it. The most creative and effective modern
organizations tend to structure their processes to emphasize group decisions. 42 They do so not only because such decisions benefit from
diverse perspectives, but because group decisions force participants to
articulate and reflect on their notions in ways that they otherwise
would not if they had made those decisions on their own.
The evidence for the thesis that self-conscious group-deliberation
produces better decisions in the sphere of legal practice is mostly anecdotal and indirect, but it is striking. The tfiesis is a major tacit
theme of Milton Regan's Eat What You Kill 43 a riveting account of the
misconduct of a Milbank Tweed bankruptcy lawyer that resulted in his
conviction for perjury. The lawyer was a loner, 4 4 and the firm's structure was highly compartmentalized. 4 5 The key decisions seem to have
been made tacitly and unreflectively.
Authority for the proposition that the tacit, individual style of decision making makes for poor decisions comes from the liability insurance industry. Insurance companies tend to promote "group
practice" organization in which group members routinely discuss and
document important decisions of all kinds. 46 They are suspicious of
"lone wolves," who practice on their own outside the view of peers,
and they often make them a focus of auditing efforts:
Of course, the type of risk management that insurers encourage
is not necessarily the same thing as ethical reflection. 4 7 But there
does seem to be an overlap. While the insurers' concerns are narrower than those of the ethicists, most of their concerns seem ethically
plausible, even if reducing liability is their motivation.
42

See generally PETER M.

LEARNING ORGANIZATION
43

SENGE, THE FIFTH DISCIPLINE: THE ART AND PRACTICE OF THE

(1990).

MILTON C. REGAN JR., EAT WHAT YOU KILL: THE FALL OF A WALL STREET LAWYER

(2004).
Id. at 53.
Id. at 304.
46
See John A. Edginton, Managing Lawyers' Risks at the Millennium, 73 TUL. L. REV.
1987, 1990 (1988).
47
SeeAnthony V. Alfieri, The Fall ofLegal Ethics and the Rise of Risk Management,94 GEO.
L.J. 1909, 1910-11 (2006). Alfieri's piece is part of an emerging literature on the organization of legal practice, which provides a promising beginning for discussion of the relation
between institutions and values. For other examples, see ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS
WITH POWER: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE LAW FIRM (1988); Elizabeth
Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, The Emerging Role ofEthics Advisors, General Counsel, and Other
Compliance Specialists in Large Law Firms, 44 ARiz. L. REV. 559 (2002); Tanina Rostain, ShelteringLawyers: The Organized Tax Bar and the Tax ShelterIndustry, 23 YALEJ. ON REG. 77 (2006).
44
45
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One might also worry that the group practice regimes favored by
insurers represent some Orwellian mechanism aimed at ferreting out
creative nonconformity and inducing unreflective group-think. This
is a possibility that should be investigated, but it is hardly an inevitable
consequence of group decision making. The consequences of deliberation depend in part on how it is organized-how much it encourages open discussion, how transparent its workings are, and what
mechanisms there are for reconciling and coordinating across groups.
Arguably, the most highly charged ethical scenarios for lawyers
look less like the Milgram experiments and more like Eat What You
Kill. In the Milgram experiments, the individuals are faced with a series of explicit commands from an authority figure. In Eat What You
Kill, the individual is responding to much more ambiguous cues, and
it is not at all clear that the relevant authority figures would be willing
to take responsibility for an explicit command, especially if their decision would have to withstand peer scrutiny. If so, then the promising
direction is not so much toward crafting psychological devices and
heuristics to preserve the autonomy of individual response. Rather, it
is toward the creation of institutional structures that encourage reflection, articulation, and transparency.

1376

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:1365

